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ABSTRACT
This work is the first attempt to analyse the existence and the magnitude of
wage penalties associated with the non-employment experience of individuals in
the Spanish labour market. For that, we draw on a sample of Spanish workers
across the period 1987-1997 with information coming from an administrative.
We find that non-employment brings an earnings set-back but subsequent
employment generates substantial recovery. In particular, the impact of past
non-employment duration increases with the time spent since previous job
separation, individuals with few job interruptions present the shortest wage
penalty effect and certain groups of workers (those aged more than 45 years,
those laid off, and those in blue collar occupations) suffer larger wage penalties
upon re-employment.
Keywirds: wage losses, job separations, non-employment, panel data.
JEL classification: J31, J63, J64.
XXXXX
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1.   INTRODUCTION
One important issue in the empirical literature of labour economics is
whether there are wage losses associated with job interruptions and whether
wage losses (if exist) are temporary. Apart from the academic interest, a-
ttempts to respond to these questions become relevant from a policy perspec-
tive. If individuals who suffer job interruptions not only experience earnings
losses during spells of interruption but are also “scarred” by their experience of
unemployment, it will contribute to wage inequality and interfere with work
incentives. The existence of persistent costs of the unemployment experience
may motivate concern over the long-term prospects of those individuals and
the most appropriate assistance policies for them. In this sense, understanding
whether the costs of job interruptions are persistent and what circumstances
may influence that persistence is an important step toward developing such
policies.
The main objective of this study is to investigate the impact of non-
employment spells on subsequent wages using Spanish data. Specifically, we are
interested in giving answers to the questions of whether wage losses are affected
by the length and the number of job separations and whether the time spent in
re-employment may erode that wage penalty. Although there are many studies
analysing these questions in the US, the evidence for the European countries is
much more limited. In fact, up to our knowledge, there is no previous studies
investigating whether there are earning losses associated with job separations in
the case of the Spanish economy.
The instrument we use to address those questions is the Spanish administra-
tive dataset HSIPRE (Histórico del Sistema de Prestaciones por Desempleo).
This data source contains information on unemployment benefit histories for a
random sample (40 per cent) of involuntarily unemployed workers (due to ei-
ther the ending of temporary contracts or individual or collective layoffs) who
ever received unemployment benefits over the period 1987-1997. The advan-
tage of this database lies in that it contains retrospective information on the last
job prior to the unemployment experience, including workers’ wage, employ-
ment duration and job category. This retrospective information makes it possi-
ble to construct a complete labour history of Spanish workers (who received
unemployment benefits at least twice) over the period 1983-1997 in order to
compare pre- and post separations wages, along with data on timing of unem-
ployment and employment spells.
The empirical framework consists of estimating a standard wage equation
using the within group (WG) technique, which is similar to a simple least square
estimation in which the variables are defined as deviations from their individual
means.
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The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. Section two reviews the
economic theories that supply predictions about the impact of unemployment on
subsequent wages. The empirical literature on the effects of job separations
upon re-employment wages is presented in section three. Section four describes
the construction of the dataset and the sample restrictions. Section five sets out
the model to be estimated later in the econometric analysis. Section six presents
estimates of workers’ wage losses, distinguishing among different characteristics
such as gender, age, type of job separation, and occupation categories. Finally,
some concluding remarks follow in section seven.
2.   ECONOMIC THEORY AND WAGE LOSSES
Several areas of economic theory provide predictions about the determi-
nants of workers mobility and the effects of that mobility on subsequent wages:
human capital theory, search theory, imperfect information theory, trade unions
theory, and efficiency wages theory.
Human capital theory establishes that, as long as workers accumulates firm-
specific skills (through experience and on-the-job training), they obtain higher
wages since their productivity increases (Becker, 1975; Mincer, 1974). When
the relationship between the worker and the firm is terminated, the contribu-
tion of firm-specific skills to the worker’s productivity finishes, as those skills are
not transferable. Moreover, unemployment experience may lead to the depre-
ciation of general skills. Both aspects related to human capital imply that workers
separated from their previous jobs are likely to be less productive in their subse-
quent jobs, at least initially, thus obtaining lower wages on re-entry.
Search or matching theory looks at workers’ mobility and at any intervening
spell of unemployment as a productive activity (Jovanovic, 1979; Mortensen,
1988). When a good (high productivity, high wage) match is terminated by ei-
ther side, match capital is lost and a subsequent wage reduction is expected,
since the wage reflects the resulting productivity of the match. However, when
a bad (low productivity, low wage) match is terminated, future wages will be
higher if a better match is achieved. Unemployment may help to attain this,
since it allows improved sorting of workers among jobs, so higher wages may be
expected.
Imperfect information theory is based on the idea that firms have a limited
knowledge of new workers’ productivity at the time of hiring. In order to re-
duce uncertainty, employers can use workers’ past unemployment history (in
terms of incidence and duration) as a signal conveying information on their pro-
ductivity. This means that workers having a history with more job interruptions
and longer unemployment durations will achieve lower wages (at least initially),
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since employers may consider them as low productivity workers (Vishwanath,
1989; Pissarides, 1992). However, if new workers prove to be of a higher pro-
ductivity than the employer initially inferred from their unemployment history,
the initial wage penalty at the time of re-employment due to incomplete informa-
tion should be eroded over time. Another prediction related to this asymmetric
information approach is that related to the type of separation: workers losing
jobs due to plant closure are expected to suffer smaller wage losses than work-
ers who have been selected for layoffs, since plant closure gives a less negative
signal and workers losing jobs this way avoid being labeled as low-ability workers
(Gibbons and Katz, 1991).
Other theories also point out that job separation and subsequent unemploy-
ment may command lower wages for workers upon re-employment. Workers
losing jobs that paid wage premiums (due to the existence of trade unions or
efficency wages to raise workers’ productivity) are likely to earn less in their
subsequent jobs if they pay standard wages. Workers who had accepted wages
below their productivity level in return for higher earnings later in their careers
(i.e. a deferred compensation scheme, Lazear, 1981) will also have lower wages
in their new jobs after separations.
3.   A LOOK AT THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
The issue of the re-employment earnings experience of unemployed workers
has been most extensively analysed in the US while the number of existing studies
for other different countries is small. In general, empirical research has focused
on the effects of worker displacement defined as the involuntary separation of
workers from their jobs due to plant closures or mass layoffs, which in turn can
be attributed to technological innovation or sectoral reallocation.
The US studies on the effects of unemployment on re-employment wages use
a wide variety of datasets. Most of the earlier research used either the Displaced
Worker Survey (DWS) supplements to the Current Population Survey (CPS) or
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The DWS is a biannual supplement
to the annual CPS and is based on retrospective information (the preceeding
three years). Displaced workers are those permanently displaced due to plant
closure, job abolition or slack work, distinguishing those with at least three years
of job tenure from all displaced workers. The PSID is a nationally representative
survey conducted to households. It started in 1968. In this survey, displaced
workers are those who have been permanently displaced, independently of their
length of service in the job. The original copies of the survey questionnarie allow
distinguishing layoffs from firings, but data used by researchers make it impossi-
ble to distinguish between workers who are laid off and workers who are fired.
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Although it has been extensively used, the DWS has some shortcomings that
make it difficult to assess the magnitude and temporal pattern of displaced
workers’ wage losses. First, focusing only on workers who have been displaced,
it lacks a comparison group (the non-displaced workers). Second, it does not
contain extensive predisplacement earnings data, so only a “before” and “after”
comparison can be done. And third, there is a tendency for workers not to re-
port more remote occasions of displacement. These problems were avoided
with the use of the PSID and other datasets (as the Pennsylvania administrative
dataset used by Jacobson et al., 1993). In particular, the longitudinal nature of
the PSID allows the follow-up of individuals in order to control for individual-
specific effects and for predisplacement and long-term postdisplacement effects.
The evidence from the US studies refers to three different dimensions of the
displacement experience. First, there are some studies addressing the fact that
the relative wages of displaced workers tend to decline prior to separation.
Ruhm (1991) and de la Rica (1995) identify a 10 per cent wage deterioration at
least two years prior to separation, while Jacobson et al. (1993) obtain that de-
terioration to be 15 per cent for high-tenure workers (six years or more) for at
least three years prior to mass layoffs or plant closures.
Second, the US evidence suggests that displaced workers face more unem-
ployment than nondisplaced workers (Podgursky and Swaim, 1987a; Swaim and
Podgursky, 1991; Ruhm, 1991). Using the PSID, Ruhm (1991) reports that dis-
placed workers experience eight weeks more unemployment than comparable
workers in the year of displacement, though less than one week four years later.
And third, displaced workers incur large and long-lasting wage losses upon
re-employment after they separate from distressed firms (Hamermesh, 1987;
Podgursky and Swaim, 1987b; Addison and Portugal, 1989; Kletzer, 1989, 1991;
Farber, 1993; Jacobson et al., 1993). Ruhm (1991) finds that wages for displaced
workers are more than 10 per cent below those for comparable nondisplaced
workers four years after displacement. Jacobson et al. (1993) reports declines of
25 per cent of pre-displacement earnings five years after separation. In general,
all those studies address the long-term nature of separations’ effects on re-
employment wages. Stevens (1997) focuses on the importance of additional job
losses that follow an initial displacement. Using the PSID, she finds that much of
the persistence of wage losses can be explained by additional job losses in the
years following an initial displacement. While average wage losses six or more
years after a job loss are approximately 9 per cent, those workers who avoid
additional displacements have wage losses of only 4 per cent.
In contrast to the overwhelming bulk of evidence on worker displacement in
the US, evidence for European economies is limited. Ackum (1991) for young
people in Sweden, Van Audenrode and Leonard (1995) for a sample of workers
in Belgium and Pichelmann and Riedel (1993) for workers in Austria find very
Instituto de Estudios Fiscales
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modest wage losses upon re-employment. In contrast, Cohen at al. (1997) ob-
tain wage losses for France of the same order of magnitude of those for the US.
In a more recent work, Burda and Mertens (2001) use data form the German
Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP). They report that full-time men displaced in
1986 and subsequently reemployed in 1987 suffer a reduction of wage growth
of less than 4 per cent when compared to a group of continuously employed
workers. What deserves attention is that this average post-displacement wage
behaviour varies across previous position in the wage distribution. Accordingly,
workers in the lowest earnings quartile (where displacement is concentrated)
gain 2 per cent more, while wage growth losses for the upper three quartiles
are 17 per cent (a figure comparable with the US evidence).
Finally, there are two other recent studies focusing their attention on the
joblessness experience of workers in the UK labour market. They obtain re-
sults very similar to those for the US. On the one hand, Arulampalam (2001)
uses a sample of men drawn from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS)
over the period 1991-1997. She finds a wage penalty attached to a spell of un-
employment on re-employment to take an inverted U-shape: it is about 6 per
cent during the first year of re-entry, increases overt the next three years
within the same employment spell to about 14 per cent, and then declines to
11 per cent.
On the other hand, Gregory and Jukes (2001) use a very large sample cons-
tructed from an administrative dataset (the linked New Earnings Survey Panel
Dataset –NESPD– and the Joint Unemployment and Vacancies Operating Sys-
tem –JUVOS–) containing information on over 150,000 men over 1984-1994.
They split the effect of unemployment into two components: unemployment
incidence (job interruption) and duration of the unemployment spell, respec-
tively. They report a long-run wage penalty associated with a job interruption of
2 per cent. In addition, they find a further wage penalty varying directly with the
length of the past unemployment spell. Combining these two effects, their re-
sults are very similar to those obtained by Arulampalam (2001), although both
studies use very different databases covering different time periods.
In the case of Spain, as far as we know, no previous studies on the likely effects
of past unemployment either in future earnings or in unemployment have been
carried out. Since the Spanish institutional setting differs from that in the US or
the UK labour markets (countries where there is evidence on scarring), it would
be highly interesting to perform such an analysis in order to shed light on whether
there are earning losses associated with job separations and their magnitude.
Furthermore, given the relevance of temporary employment in the Spanish
economy, other issues to address should be the significance of the reason for job
separation (ending of a temporary contract versus either layoff or firing) and of
additional job separations that follow an initial one.
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4.   DATA AND SAMPLE
In this section, we describe how we have constructed the data from the origi-
nal dataset and what type of sample restrictions we have imposed in order to in-
vestigate the influence of non-employment on earnings upon re-employment.
4.1.   Constructing the data
The data we use come from longitudinal linkage of records from monthly
payroll computer files for all registered unemployed workers who receive all
types of unemployment benefits from the Spanish public agency in charge of the
administration of the payment of unemployment benefits (INEM, Instituto Na-
cional de Empleo).
The original administrative data, the Benefits Integrated System (SIPRE, Sis-
tema Integrado de Prestaciones), can be defined as a cross-section, since it
comes from the monthly payroll computer tapes of unemployment recipients. It
registers claims of unemployment insurance (UI) and unemployment assistance
(UA) benefits by all fully unemployed workers as well as some of those partially
unemployed (i.e. on short-time work)1. From those monthly tapes information
on individual entries to the Unemployment Compensation System (UCS) were
extracted so that their evolution therein could be followed. This was under-
taken by INEM with the purpose of facilitating the management of the system,
thus allowing a complete month by month follow-up of recipients. This new
longitudinal database has received the name of ‘historical’ SIPRE (HSIPRE). We
constructed our longitudinal data from a 40 per cent random samples of all un-
employed workers who started their first UI or UA spell either in February,
June, or November over the period 1987-19972.
All that means that HSIPRE gives information on spells of benefit receipt for
each individual, being that information collected at the moment of entry in the
UCS and during the ongoing unemployment spell. But what becomes essential
for our purposes is that collected information relates not only to individual
characteristics (age, gender, number of children –if any-, and region where
benefit is paid) and benefit parameters (level and duration) of covered unem-
ployment spells but also to some important features of former employment
relationships.
                                          
1   There are two groups excluded from the files by definition: workers who quit and workers
with very short-time contracts whose contribution periods are below the minimum.
2   HSIPRE data have also been used by Cebrián et al. (1996) and García-Serrano (1997) to
analyse the exit from unemployment. However both studies focus on a single cohort of UI
entrants in June 1990. Other works using the SIPRE data for a larger period of time (1987-
1993) are Jenkins and García-Serrano (2000) and Arranz and Muro (2001).
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More precisely, information is gathered on the duration of previous job, rea-
son for separation (mainly, ending of temporary contract, collective layoff or
individual layoff), former job category (a proxy for occupation and educational
attainment), and former wage (the average wage on the last six months of em-
ployment)3.
Therefore, we always have information on the previous employment rela-
tionship which generated the right to receiving unemployment benefits (either
UI or UA) for each individual entering the UCS. This means that we are able to
construct “labour histories” for those individuals: we know the duration of for-
mer job (and other characteristics of the employment relationship), the date of
job termination (and hence the date of entry into the UCS), and the date of exit
from unemployment (for those finding a job before benefit exhaustion, we
know the date of exit and, thus, the date of entry into a new employment en-
gagement; and for those exhausting the UI entitlement period, we can add in-
formation on duration of UA benefits if received and on duration of non-
employment otherwise).
Furthermore, thanks to the existence of information on the prior job match
of new unemployed workers, our period of study is extended to some years
prior to 1987. One important issue to have in mind is that collecting information
on subsequent wages results impossible for those who never return to the UCS.
But information on subsequent wages is always present for those who terminate
any future job match.
4.2.   Sample restrictions
To be included in the analysis the individuals should meet some criteria. First,
they must have entered the UCS for the first time in any of the months selected
for the analysis (February, June, or November) over the period 1987-1997.
Second, they must be in full unemployment; this means that we have excluded
those entering covered unemployment due to either temporary layoffs or short-
time work. Third, they were in paid employment perceiving a wage equal to or
greater than the statutory minimun wage (SMW) and working full-time (as infor-
mation on exact working hours is not available, this is the only way to approximate
daily wages consistently). Fourth, they must have an entitlement period (ex-
pressed in days) to receive UI or UA benfits which correspond with the legal pro-
visions; this implies that we have also excluded those workers whose entitlement
period did not correspond to those provisions (taking into accout the reform in-
                                          
3   Although information on protected unemployment spells and benefit parameters is very
complete, information on marital status and educational attainment, for instance, does not
exist. In addition, more details on the former job (industry, firm size, redundancy payments)
are, unfortunately, not available in the dataset.
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troduced in April 1992 which modified the potential entitlement spells). Fifth, to
avoid problems associated with the current employment status, we exclude self-
employment. Sixth, we limit our sample to workers aged between 20 and 52 at
the moment of first entry into the UCS (to avoid complications associated with
early retirement) and to workers for whom the individual, job and unemployment
spell characteristics are present. Finally, observations with missing values (mainly in
the job category variable) were not omitted from the sample; thus, appropriate
dummy variables for missing cases are used as additional regressors.
Studies using longitudinal data usually establish an additional restriction in or-
der to reduce biases due to sample attrition. They require every worker to re-
ceive some wage or salary earnings during each calendar year (see Jacobson et
al, 1993, and Stevens, 1997, for the US; and Arumpalam, 2001, and Gregory and
Jukes, 2001, for the UK). In our case, this restriction is not necessary, since all
workers who come back to the UCS incorporate the information on former
wage. It is obvious that those workers who once entered the UCS and exited
but never returned do not contribute information on re-employment wages.
For us to have information on at least two employment spells and two wages,
workers must have been separated from their previous jobs and entered the
UCS at least two times. This means that we restrict the sample to those who
were continuosly present in our data in paid employment in at least two em-
ployment spells (with at least one intervening non- employment spell).
After implementing the previous restrictions, the sample consists of 65,340
workers. Of them, 77.2 per cent have experienced two employment spells,
17.6 per cent three spells, 3.6 per cent four spells, and 1.6 per cent at least five
spells. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for all workers distinguishing by their
number of employment spells.
Table 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS VARIABLES FOR WORKERS WITH AT LEAST TWO
EMPLOYMENT SPELLS BY NUMBER OF EMPLOYMENT SPELLS
1.st employment 2.nd employment 3.rd employment 4.th employment 5.th employment
Variables
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Gender
(men=1, women=0) 0.588 0.492 0.588 0.492 0.640 0.480 0.635 0.482 0.574 0.495
Age (years old)
  > 20 and ≤ 25
  > 25 and ≤ 30
  > 30 and ≤ 35
  > 35 and ≤ 40
  > 40 and ≤ 45
  > 45
0.561
0.206
0.094
0.062
0.045
0.032
0.496
0.404
0.291
0.242
0.208
0.176
0.337
0.332
0.143
0.078
0.055
0.055
0.473
0.471
0.350
0.268
0.229
0.228
0.220
0.408
0.169
0.085
0.057
0.061
0.414
0.492
0.375
0.279
0.232
0.240
0.148
0.411
0.194
0.100
0.070
0.078
0.355
0.492
0.395
0.300
0.255
0.268
0.091
0.358
0.221
0.115
0.085
0.130
0.288
0.480
0.415
0.320
0.278
0.336
(Keep.)
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(Continuation.)
1.st employment 2.nd employment 3.rd employment 4.th employment 5.th employment
Variables
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Children (yes) 0.176 0.381 0.267 0.442 0.297 0.457 0.312 0.464 0.360 0.480
Job category
  High level/associated
    professional techni-
    cians and supervisors
  Technical assistants and
    skilled clerical workers
  Semi-skilled clerical
    workers
  Unskilled clerical
    workers
  Skilled production
    workers
  Semi-skilled production
    workers
  Unskilled production
    workers
  Missing
0.059
0.084
0.038
0.158
0.146
0.186
0.268
0.061
0.235
0.277
0.192
0.365
0.353
0.389
0.443
0.239
0.076
0.111
0.044
0.154
0.192
0.175
0.221
0.028
0.265
0.314
0.204
0.361
0.394
0.380
0.415
0.164
0.066
0.102
0.046
0.124
0.236
0.173
0.224
0.028
0.248
0.303
0.209
0.330
0.425
0.378
0.417
0.166
0.061
0.087
0.039
0.105
0.275
0.190
0.213
0.031
0.240
0.281
0.193
0.306
0.447
0.392
0.409
0.174
0.049
0.086
0.029
0.085
0.293
0.226
0.194
0.038
0.216
0.281
0.167
0.278
0.455
0.418
0.396
0.192
Duration (days)
  Tenure in current
    employment
  Previous
    unemployment
  Previous
    non-employment
  Accumulated past
    unemployment
  Accumulated
    non-employment
Accumulated tenure
506.6
—
—
—
—
506.6
424.7
—
—
—
—
424.7
577.2
231.5
380.2
231.5
380.2
1083.9
443.3
241.9
367.3
241.9
367.3
706.8
496.4
181.1
303.3
351.1
577.5
1268.5
356.2
174.2
285.3
259.8
397.5
717.0
418.5
152.7
258.5
411.4
675.4
1341.9
284.7
136.6
231.4
231.1
366.3
658.9
358.3
133.7
216.8
474.8
747.8
1405.0
206.9
96.7
181.4
210.0
332.1
567.9
Daily wages
(€-1990 prices) 20.2 8.2 22.5 9.7 22.1 9.2 21.3 8.8 19.7 9.1
Reason for job termination
  End of contract
  Collective layoff
  Individual layoff
  Others
0.852
0.130
0.016
0.002
0.355
0.336
0.127
0.043
0.873
0.111
0.014
0.001
0.332
0.314
0.118
0.037
0.905
0.085
0.009
0.001
0.294
0.279
0.094
0.038
0.935
0.060
0.004
0.001
0.247
0.237
0.066
0.030
0.957
0.040
0.001
0.002
0.203
0.197
0.031
0.044
Regions
  Andalucia
  Extremadura
  Canarias
  Asturias
  Murcia
  Castilla-León
  Castilla-Mancha
0.187
0.018
0.072
0.019
0.028
0.046
0.032
0.390
0.135
0.259
0.138
0.165
0.209
0.176
0.187
0.018
0.072
0.019
0.028
0.044
0.032
0.390
0.132
0.259
0.137
0.165
0.206
0.175
0.200
0.020
0.085
0.016
0.030
0.041
0.030
0.400
0.139
0.279
0.125
0.170
0.198
0.170
0.224
0.022
0.087
0.012
0.029
0.037
0.032
0.417
0.147
0.282
0.109
0.167
0.189
0.177
0.273
0.017
0.056
0.003
0.037
0.036
0.025
0.446
0.130
0.229
0.054
0.190
0.185
0.156
(Keep.)
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(Continuation.)
1.st employment 2.nd employment 3.rd employment 4.th employment 5.th employment
Variables
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
  Galicia
  País Vasco
  Cantabria
  Cataluña
  Madrid
  Navarra
  Baleares
  Aragón
  La Rioja
0.060
0.037
0.009
0.157
0.160
0.010
0.030
0.022
0.005
0.238
0.188
0.097
0.364
0.367
0.100
0.170
0.147
0.069
0.060
0.036
0.009
0.158
0.162
0.010
0.030
0.022
0.005
0.238
0.187
0.096
0.364
0.368
0.100
0.170
0.146
0.070
0.058
0.032
0.009
0.142
0.149
0.008
0.048
0.018
0.005
0.233
0.177
0.093
0.349
0.356
0.089
0.214
0.134
0.070
0.051
0.023
0.008
0.125
0.116
0.009
0.092
0.011
0.005
0.220
0.150
0.090
0.331
0.320
0.094
0.290
0.107
0.071
0.037
0.015
0.004
0.118
0.077
0.009
0.174
0.006
0.006
0.190
0.123
0.062
0.323
0.266
0.093
0.379
0.076
0.076
Entry year 88.4 1.976 90.5 1.815 91.3 1.656 91.8 1.537 92.3 1.456
Exit year 89.9 1.717 92.5 2.059 93.1 1.915 93.3 1.820 93.4 1.588
Sample 65,340 65,340 14,880 3,397 1,041
Workers’ age distribution change as we move from the first employment
spell to the second and subsequent employment spells. The proportion of
workers aged 20-25 decreases from 56 per cent in the first employment spell to
34 per cent in the second spell, 22 per cent in the third, 15 per cent in the
fourth and 9 per cent in the fifth. At the same time, the share of those aged 25-
30 grows from 21 in the first employment spell up to 35 per cent in the fifth
employment spell. These figures simply imply that workers become older as
calendar time passes by.
The distribution of workers between those with and those without de-
pendent children (that may be considered a proxy for marital status) reflects
what happens with the age. The share of workers who have dependent chil-
dren grows from 18 per cent in the first employment spell up to 36 per cent in
the fifth employment spell.
The main reason for job separation is the ending of a temporary contract:
more than 85 per cent of all first employment spells terminate due to that rea-
son. This proportion increases with the number of employment spells until
reaching 96 per cent in the fifth employment spell.
Workers with job interruptions are characterised to having been employed in
large proportions in manual, low skilled jobs across the employment spells. This
proportion happens to be around 40 per cent across the first five employment
spells. It is worth noting that the share of workers in manual, high skilled jobs
increases from 15 per cent in the first employment spell to 29 per cent in the
fifth employment spell. This rising trend may be a reflection of the impact of the
sharp economic crisis of the early 1990’s in the manufacturing industry in Spain.
Average duration of the first employment relationship is almost 510 days. It
increases to 577 days in the second spell but decreases to 358 days in the fifth
Instituto de Estudios Fiscales
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spell. However, these figures are not really informative since the distributions of
job durations may have changed. Table 2 has been designed to shed light on
that. It provides the distributions for the duration of tenure in the current job
but also the distributions for the duration of unemployment and non-
employment spells for workers who experience at least two employment spells.
Table 2
DISTRIBUTION OF TENURE IN CURRENT EMPLOYMENT,
PREVIOS NON-EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION FOR
WORKERS WITH AT LEAST TWO EMPLOYMENT SPELLS
1st empl. 2nd empl. 3rd empl. 4th empl. 5th empl.Duration
(months) E E PNE PU E PNE PU E PNE PU E PNE PU
≤ 6 0.426 0.256 0.395 0.661 0.262 0.456 0.752 0.309 0.521 0.826 0.316 0.624 0.912
> 6 and ≤ 12 0.195 0.297 0.220 0.147 0.364 0.253 0.132 0.419 0.256 0.104 0.525 0.229 0.053
> 12 and ≤ 24 0.163 0.213 0.230 0.148 0.212 0.203 0.100 0.177 0.167 0.065 0.118 0.122 0.036
> 24 and ≤ 36 0.107 0.132 0.097 0.032 0.106 0.064 0.015 0.070 0.043 0.005 0.030 0.018 —
> 36 0.109 0.102 0.058 0.012 0.056 0.025 0.001 0.025 0.012 0.001 0.011 0.007 —
Sample 65,340 65,340 14,880 3,397 1,041
Note:   E = Employment; PNE = Previous non-employment; PU = Previous unemployment.
Comparing the distributions of job duration across the first five employment
spells, we observe that the shortest duration category (six months or less) is the
most important, with a reduction of its weight from the first employment spell
(43 per cent) to the fifth employment spell (32 per cent). At the same time,
there is an increase of the weight of the medium-tenured spells (6-24 months).
Finally, the share of the category concerning the longest employment durations
(more than 36 months) decreases from 11 per cent in the case of the first em-
ployment spell to only 1 per cent in the case of the fifth employment spell.
Tables A.1 to A.4 in the Appendix provide information concerning the em-
ployment, unemployment and non-employment duration distributions distin-
guishing among different groups of workers according to the number of job
interruptions. This is done in order to shed some light on issues related to the
unstability of job matches. In particular, workers with at least five job interrup-
tions display shorter average employment durations in comparison with workers
with only two, three or four employment interruptions. Moreover, when we
consider the first job match, differences among those groups of workers are
relevant: the shortest job durations weigh far more for workers with at least five
employment spells (76 per cent) when compared to workers with only four (63
per cent), three (52 per cent) or two (39 per cent) employment spells. The same
is true for the second and subsequent employment spells. This suggests that the
first group of workers appears to work in more unstable, temporary jobs.
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The short-term, temporary nature of the majority of employment relation-
ships drives the appearance of the covered previous unemployment spells dis-
tribution. Two out of three unemployment spells last six months or less after
the first job interruption. This proportion increases to more than 90 per cent
unemployment spells after the fourth job interruption. In fact, average duration
decreases from 231 days for the first unemployment spell to 134 days for the
fifth unemployment spell. These figures suggest again that as long as workers
accumulates job matches and interruptions their employment relationships
seem to be more unstable.
If we consider non-employment instead of unemployment distributions, the
share of the shortest durations turns out to be lower than in the distribution of
the previous unemployment durations for all workers. Thus, less than 40 per
cent of all workers presents previous non-employment durations of six months
or less after the first job interruption, share which increases to 62 per cent after
the fourth job interruption. Accordingly, the share of the rest of durations in-
creases with the number of job interruptions, as many individuals add time
spent in inactivity to time spent in covered unemployment. The result is that
average duration of non-employment diminshes from  over one year for the first
spell to about seven months for the fifth spell.
Regarding wages, Table 1 shows that average daily wages (in 1990 €) in-
crease from 20.2 € in the first employment spell to 21.2 € in the fourth spell. In
other words, on average there was a real wage gain when workers moved from
one job match to another job match with an intervening non-employment pe-
riod. In order to compare wage levels between different groups of workers,
Table 3 presents the average daily wage for all workers with at least two em-
ployment spells.
Male, older, more qualified workers receive the highest wages during their
first and subsequent employment spells. Those with children and those collec-
tively laid off also gain more. One important feature coming out from the figures
is the relationship between the wage level and the duration of previous non(un)-
employment: the longer the past non-employment or unemployment spell, the
lower the average daily wage  in the current job4.
When we provide separate information on average wages for workers with
different number of employment spells (see Tables A.5 to A.8), the above-
mentioned evidence holds. Wages increases for all group of variables across the
second and subsequent employment spells, although the magnitude of wage
gains differs among groups of workers.
                                          
4   One interesting issue to be investigated would be how wages of individuals re-entering em-
ployment after a spell out of work compare with wages of other workers. Gregg and Wads-
worth (2000) have found that there are large entry wage gaps relative to other jobs in the case
of the UK economy and that the wage gap has increased during the 1980s and the 1990s.
Table 3
DAILY WAGES (€ in 1990) FOR WORKERS WITH AT LEAST TWO EMPLOYMENT SPELLS
1st employment 2nd employment 3rd employment 4th employment 5th employment
Variables
Mean Std. Freq. Mean Std. Freq. Mean Std. Freq. Mean Std. Freq. Mean Std. Freq.
Gender
  Women
  Men
19.11
20.97
7.49
8.58
26909
38431
21.12
23.42
9.11
10.00
26909
38431
21.26
22.56
9.47
9.02
5355
9525
20.11
21.91
8.86
8.70
1240
2157
17.88
21.04
8.82
9.08
443
598
Age (years old)
  > 20 and ≤ 25
  > 25 and ≤ 30
  > 30 and ≤ 35
  > 35 and ≤ 40
  > 40 and ≤ 45
  > 45
18.94
21.50
22.25
21.76
22.21
22.24
6.29
8.80
10.24
10.39
11.43
11.97
36632
13459
6125
4081
2953
2090
20.57
23.03
24.21
23.69
23.40
23.53
7.24
9.54
11.39
11.54
11.63
12.07
21989
21709
9357
5080
3614
3591
20.79
22.25
23.27
22.56
21.87
22.04
7.84
8.76
10.61
10.41
9.72
9.67
3268
6078
2513
1263
847
911
20.12
21.41
22.31
22.02
20.94
19.27
7.78
8.45
9.38
11.13
8.61
7.09
503
1395
658
340
237
264
16.75
20.13
20.93
18.61
21.18
18.44
6.71
9.24
9.37
9.19
10.94
7.62
95
373
230
120
88
135
Job category
  High level/associated
    professional technicians
    and supervisors
  Technical assistants and
    skilled clerical workers
  Semi-skilled clerical
    workers
  Unskilled clerical workers
  Skilled production
    workers
  Semi-skilled production
    workers
  Unskilled production
    workers
  Missing
34.43
24.53
21.64
19.86
20.34
19.51
18.15
11.36
13.94
10.46
6.50
6.26
6.27
5.93
5.15
0.26
3833
5484
2498
10334
9545
12129
17541
3976
38.00
26.27
23.02
21.61
21.88
20.72
19.04
11.15
14.75
11.06
7.45
7.34
7.29
6.96
6.01
0.20
4963
7260
2856
10078
12519
11408
14446
1810
36.40
25.56
22.33
21.53
21.64
20.95
19.30
11.068
13.91
10.81
7.42
7.37
7.20
7.41
6.28
0.164
983
1519
680
1850
3519
2572
3336
421
33.86
22.64
23.31
21.14
21.19
20.06
19.39
11.01
14.67
8.91
8.26
7.98
7.03
7.61
6.62
0.15
208
294
132
355
935
645
722
106
32.96
19.80
20.11
18.68
19.65
19.34
18.87
11.04
17.52
9.13
7.22
6.66
7.77
8.32
7.47
0.17
51
90
30
88
305
235
202
40
(Keep.)
(Continuation.)
1st employment 2nd employment 3rd employment 4th employment 5th employment
Variables
Mean Std. Freq. Mean Std. Freq. Mean Std. Freq. Mean Std. Freq. Mean Std. Freq.
Current tenure (months)
  ≤ 6
  > 6 and ≤ 12
  > 12 and ≤ 24
  > 24 and ≤ 36
  > 36
18.80
19.76
20.61
20.37
25.72
6.75
7.36
7.69
8.24
12.19
27837
12765
10629
6990
7119
20.29
20.11
23.84
25.13
28.51
7.81
8.79
9.18
10.23
12.51
16743
19391
13899
8634
6673
20.88
19.81
24.48
25.42
27.21
8.10
8.79
8.92
9.79
10.65
3894
5418
3152
1580
836
21.38
19.04
23.85
25.54
26.62
8.28
8.54
8.19
9.64
9.34
1050
1425
600
238
84
21.54
17.26
24.13
23.52
25.19
7.80
9.11
9.27
7.59
10.37
329
547
123
31
11
Past unemployment (months)
  ≤ 6
  > 6 and ≤ 12
  > 12 and ≤ 24
  > 24 and ≤ 36
  > 36
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
22.75
23.14
21.65
19.19
17.75
9.80
9.71
9.51
7.93
7.28
43198
9635
9668
2065
774
22.38
22.63
19.98
17.45
14.55
9.27
8.88
8.86
8.02
4.70
11184
1963
1491
222
20
21.44
21.68
18.64
15.30
19.86
8.92
8.28
7.64
6.90
1.85
2805
352
220
18
2
19.73
21.10
16.71
9.22
8.12
6.45
949
55
37
Past non-employment
(months)
  ≤ 6
  > 6 and ≤ 12
  > 12 and ≤ 24
  > 24 and ≤ 36
  > 36
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
23.53
22.55
21.99
20.80
19.71
10.24
9.36
9.27
8.72
9.52
25829
14368
15026
6307
3810
22.91
22.39
21.11
19.43
18.79
9.42
8.91
8.93
8.78
8.78
6783
3762
3014
953
368
21.66
21.55
20.34
19.16
17.45
9.27
8.15
8.60
7.10
6.97
1771
870
568
146
42
19.13
20.66
21.00
19.24
16.67
9.14
8.44
9.47
12.21
7.66
650
238
127
19
7
Children
  Yes
  No
21.98
19.82
10.71
7.51
11493
53847
23.18
22.21
11.16
9.11
17453
47887
22.20
22.04
9.76
8.97
4422
10458
21.56
21.12
9.20
8.61
1061
2336
20.35
19.33
8.54
9.39
375
666
Reason for job termination
  End of contract
  Collective layoff
  Individual layoff
  Others
19.63
23.13
26.73
23.06
7.29
11.61
11.76
8.40
55652
8492
1076
120
21.88
26.13
29.51
30.06
8.95
13.14
12.88
13.34
57074
7252
925
89
21.83
24.21
27.10
29.86
8.90
11.39
11.92
10.84
13459
1265
134
22
21.17
22.10
25.72
29.49
8.75
9.37
8.08
16.20
3176
203
15
3
19.69
19.16
18.98
31.23
9.17
6.88
0.00
15.71
996
42
1
2
Sample 65,340 65,340 14,880 3,397 1,041
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5.   MODEL SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION
To measure the effect of the length of time since a job separation took place,
the number of job interruptions and the duration of the employment spell on
subsequent wages, we use a wage equation of standard form, including human
capital variables and measures of time spent in non-employment and employ-
ment. More specifically, the effect of non-employment for worker i on wages in
year t can be modelled as:
itiititit DX)ln(w ε+λ+α+β= (1)
where ln(wit) is the natural logarithm of daily wage at time t for individual i de-
flated to 1990 prices by the retail prices index; Xit is a vector of observable
variables which can be time variant or invariant; Dit is a dummy variable that
indicates the recent spell of non-employment prior to the wage observation
(this dummy variable takes value 1 when the worker exits out of non-
employment k quarters before to the wage observation); λi is a time invariant
individual specific error that captures the effects of unobservable characteristics;
and εit is assumed to have a constant variance and to be uncorrelated across in-
dividuals and time. With this specification we try to exploit two of the main
strenghts of our data set: it covers a long period of time and it contains informa-
tion on many individuals having different numbers of employment spells. This
will allow us to obtain a picture of wage losses across time and workers.
The parameters of interest (α,β,λ) are estimated using within group (WG) es-
timation. This estimation method has been used recently in the empirical wage
losses literature (Jacobson et al., 1993; Stevens, 1997; Arulampalam, 2001). It is
equivalent to a simple least squares estimation of the model in which the variables
are defined as deviations from their means. This estimation approach is a generali-
sation of the "difference in differences" technique which requires individuals to be
found in employment in at least two spells with non missing wage information5.
This method controls for a possible correlation between λi and Xit. For exam-
ple, tenure and experience (age) variables will be correlated with unobservable
                                          
5   The selection of a sample of workers with at least two employment spells may create a
non-random sample because we have dropped workers with only one job interruption who
do not report information on two job matches and their corresponding wages (i.e. they do
not come back to the UCS after re-entering employment). If this is not properly taking into
account, the estimated wage losses may be understated. To correct this potential non-
randomness, we have estimated a reduced form probit model (as one cross-section) on the
presence in the wage sample. We have included the associated Heckman correction term as
a regressor in the wage equation. Results indicate that the correction term is not significant
and the estimated coefficients in the wage equation are unchanged. This seems to point out
that this type of selection is random. Estimates for the probit model are available from the
authors on request.
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job specific variables because high-tenured workers are better paid since their
productivity (unobservable) rises with time on the job and more experience im-
plies higher general skills. Moreover, if less-able or motivated (less productivity)
workers are more prone to layoffs, estimates of displacement effects may fail to
control for λi and will be biased toward finding higher wage losses. As a result of
this, tenure and experience variables, or type of separation, will be correlated
with unobservable job specific variables and, therefore, ordinary least squares
(OLS) generates biased parameters for tenure and experience variables (see
Altonji and Williams,1997, and Dustman and Meghir, 1999).
In the next section, we estimate a basic model that includes in X variables
such as age, number of children, job tenure, regions and entry and exit years
dummies to control for calendar and business cycle effects, respectively.
6.   RESULTS
We present our results in order to shed light on three issues. First, whether
wage losses are affected by the length of time spent into non-employment after
a job separation takes place and the time spent later in re-employment. Second,
whether differences on wage losses exist according to workers’ characteristics
prior to the job separation. And third, whether the existence of multiple job in-
terruptions have an effect on subsequent wage losses.
6.1.   The effect of the length of job interruptions and the time spent in
6.1.   re-employment
Table 4 provides the estimates of log real daily wage equations for all indi-
viduals. The first column shows the estimated wage losses for all workers in-
cluded in the sample when we take into account previous non-employment
duration since job interruption and tenure in subsequent employment engage-
ments. Dummies for these variables allow us to check whether the “scarring
effect” of a spell of job interruption diminishes over time.
Compared to those workers who only remain one year or less in non-
employment, wage equation estimates indicate that an individual who remains
more than two but less than three years in non-employment is estimated to
earn about 2.3 per cent less6. This scarring effect of non-employment increases
to 5.5 per cent if the individual stays more than three years in non employment.
Therefore, the longer the permanence in non-employment, the larger the rela-
tive wage loss the individual incurs.
                                          
6   The percentage effect on wages is calculated as (eβ – 1)*100.
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Table 4
LOG REAL DAILY WAGE EQUATIONS
All sample
Two job
interruptions
Three job
interruptions
Four job
interruptions
Five job
interruptions
Coeff.
(Std. error)
Signif. Coeff.
(Std. error)
Signif. Coeff.
(Std. error)
Signif. Coeff.
(Std. error)
Signif. Coeff.
(Std. error)
Signif.
Tenure
1 year or less
> 1 and ≤ 2 years
> 2 and ≤ 3 years
> 3 years
—
0.111
(0.003)
0.116
(0.003)
0.174
(0.004)
***
***
***
—
0.111
(0.003)
0.127
(0.004)
0.177
(0.005)
***
***
***
—
0.117
(0.005)
0.108
(0.007)
0.157
(0.008)
***
***
***
—
0.099
(0.009)
0.061
(0.014)
0.118
(0.022)
***
***
***
—
0.131
(0.017)
-0.158
(0.027)
0.068
(0.048)
***
***
Non-employment
1 year or less
> 1 and ≤ 2 years
> 2 and ≤ 3 years
> 3 years
—
0.022
(0.003)
-0.023
(0.004)
-0.054
(0.006)
***
***
***
—
0.020
(0.004)
-0.033
(0.006)
-0.070
(0.007)
***
***
***
—
0.015
(0.005)
-0.022
(0.009)
-0.043
(0.014)
***
***
***
—
-0.003
(0.010)
-0.040
(0.019)
-0.122
(0.039)
***
***
—
0.049
(0.016)
-0.010
(0.044)
-0.170
(0.078)
***
***
Notes:   Regression controls for individual fixed effects, regions, age, children and calendar and business cycle
dummies variables.
***   indicates significance at 1 per cent.
Note that at the same time the longer the time spent with the following em-
ployer the larger the wage gains. Compared to those workers with short job
tenure (one year or less), an individual who keeps working more than two but
less than three years is estimated to earn about 12 per cent more. This wage
gain increases to 19 per cent per cent if the individual stays more than three
years in employment. All this means that, although the impact of past non-
employment duration implies the existence of wage losses, the non-employment
incidence is found to have a temporary penalty effect since it disappears rapidly
after workers re-enter into employment.
The second and subsequent columns in the table provide the same informa-
tion that the first one but they are aimed at checking whether the scarring effect
of a spell of job interruption diminishes over time for individuals who expe-
rienced only two, only three, only four or at least five job interruptions. In other
words, the same model has been estimated for different groups of workers
separated according to their number of job interruptions. Results indicate that
wage losses associated with the length of previous non-employment spells are
larger for workers who experience a higher number of job interruptions. Thus,
a non-employment spell of more than three years carries a wage penalty of 7
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per cent for workers with only two job interruptions. This penalty increases
up to 13 per cent and 19 per cent for workers with four and at least five job
interruptions.
In contrast, re-employment wage gains are smaller for individuals with more
job interruptions. Staying more than three years in employment implies a wage
gain of nearly 20 per cent for workers with only two job interruptions, while
wage gains after the same period of time in re-employment are limited to 7 per
cent for workers with at least five job interruptions. This means that workers
characterised by having a higher number of job interruptions incur more perma-
nent wage penalties upon re-employment since the effect of non-employment
duration does not disappear with re-employment in the short-term.
6.2.   Differences by workers' characteristics
Table 5 provides the estimated wage losses for various workers’ characteris-
tics. The effect of non-employment duration is larger in the case of men than in
the case of women. After a non-employment spell of two to three years, men
incur wage losses (4 per cent) that are non-existent for women. The scar re-
mains larger for men (6.6 per cent) than for women (3.7 per cent) after a non-
employment spell of more than three years. Gender differences are also present
when workers come back to the employment status. Re-employment implies
wage gains for both men and women, having the latter more steep wage gains.
Next columns in Table 5 disaggregate workers by reason for job termination
(whether the employment relationship terminated due to the ending of a tem-
porary contract or layoff)7. The effect of non-employment duration on wage
losses turns out to be larger in the case of workers who were laid off than in the
case of comparable workers whose temporary contracts ended. A non-
employment spell of more than three years carries a wage penalty higher than
10 per cent for those laid off in their previous job but less than 5 per cent for
those whose contract ended8. In addition, re-employment wage gains increase
more quickly for the latter. Therefore, workers whose job termination was due
to the ending of temporary contracts not only suffer a less pronounced scarring
effect attached to the duration of non-employment spells but also their wages
increase more rapidily with job tenure after re-employment.
                                          
7   We have merged spells ending due to collective and individual layoffs because the small
number of observations concerning individual layoffs generated unreliable coefficients.
8   In estimations not shown here, we have also found that workers losing jobs due to
collective layoffs suffer smaller wage losses than workers who have been individually laid off,
as Gibbons and Katz (1991) argue. However, as we have just said, the small sample of
individuals having been laid off generated unreliable coefficients, which has refrained us to
provide the results differentiated for both reasons for job termination.
Table 5
LOG REAL DAILY WAGE EQUATIONS BY WORKERS' CHARACTERISTICS
(gender, reason for job termination, and age)
Gender Reason for job termination Age-groups
Men Women End of contract Layoff > 20 and ≤ 35 > 35 and ≤ 45 > 45
Coeff.
(Std. error)
Signif. Coeff.
(Std. error)
Signif. Coeff.
(Std. error)
Signif. Coeff.
(Std. error)
Signif. Coeff.
(Std. error)
Signif. Coeff.
(Std. error)
Signif. Coeff.
(Std. error)
Signif.
Tenure
1 year or less
> 1 and ≤ 2 years
> 2 and ≤ 3 years
> 3 years
—
0.106
(0.003)
0.111
(0.004)
0.164
(0.005)
—
***
***
***
—
0.120
(0.004)
0.126
(0.005)
0.191
(0.006)
—
***
***
***
—
0.117
(0.003)
0.115
(0.004)
0.175
(0.005)
—
***
***
***
—
0.072
(0.014)
0.086
(0.017)
0.116
(0.014)
—
***
***
***
—
0.124
(0.003)
0.140
(0.004)
0.217
(0.004)
—
***
***
***
—
0.117
(0.009)
0.097
(0.012)
0.111
(0.012)
—
***
***
***
—
0.077
(0.014)
0.084
(0.019)
0.102
(0.018)
—
***
***
***
Non-employment
1 year or less
> 1 and ≤ 2 years
> 2 and ≤ 3 years
> 3 years
—
0.017
(0.004)
-0.038
(0.006)
-0.064
(0.009)
—
***
***
***
—
0.030
(0.005)
-0.001
(0.007)
-0.036
(0.009)
—
***
***
—
0.022
(0.003)
-0.024
(0.005)
-0.044
(0.007)
—
***
***
***
—
-0.019
(0.014)
-0.057
(0.021)
-0.107
(0.028)
—
***
***
—
0.063
(0.003)
0.043
(0.005)
0.038
(0.007)
—
***
***
***
—
0.025
(0.009)
-0.045
(0.014)
-0.041
(0.020)
—
***
***
**
—
0.007
(0.014)
-0.057
(0.021)
-0.071
(0.029)
—
***
***
Notes:   Regression controls for individual fixed effects, regions, age, children and calendar and business cycle dummies variables.
**   indicates significance at 5 per cent.
***   indicates significance at 1 per cent.
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Estimations for three different age groups show an interesting relationship
between age and subquent wage losses. While spells of non-employment do not
carry a scarring effect on future wages for young workers (under 35 years),
prime-age workers and, above all, older workers (over 45 year) are seriously
penalized. For the latter, the effect of non-employment is larger than for prime-
age workers. After a non-employment spell of more than three years, older
workers suffer a penalty of 7.4 per cent (for prime-age workers relative wage
losses is around 4 per cent). These results are consistent with the evidence
found by Gregory and Jukes (2001) for the UK: wage penalties are least for
young workers and greatest for prime-age workers. At the same time, re-
employment implies strong wage gains for young workers, while wage increases
for prime-age and older workers are more limited.
Table 6
LOG REAL DAILY WAGE EQUATIONS BY JOB CATEGORY
Job category
White collar
skilled workers
Clerical workers
Blue collar
skilled workers
Blue collar
unskilled workers
Coeff.
(Std. error)
Signif. Coeff.
(Std. error)
Signif. Coeff.
(Std. error)
Signif. Coeff.
(Std. error)
Signif.
Tenure
1 year or less
> 1 and ≤ 2 years
> 2 and ≤ 3 years
> 3 years
—
0.110
(0.017)
0.088
(0.021)
0.191
(0.022)
—
***
***
***
—
0.114
(0.006)
0.140
(0.007)
0.197
(0.008)
—
***
***
***
—
0.090
(0.007)
0.065
(0.009)
0.099
(0.010)
—
***
***
***
—
0.089
(0.004)
0.072
(0.005)
0.116
(0.007)
—
***
***
***
Non-employment
1 year or less
> 1 and ≤ 2 years
> 2 and ≤ 3 years
> 3 years
—
-0.043
(0.019)
-0.048
(0.032)
-0.068
(0.045)
—
**
—
0.006
(0.006)
-0.014
(0.010)
-0.088
(0.014)
—
***
—
-0.005
(0.008)
-0.093
(0.013)
-0.134
(0.017)
—
***
***
—
-0.006
(0.004)
-0.047
(0.007)
-0.086
(0.010)
—
***
***
Notes:   Regression controls for individual fixed effects, regions, age, children and calendar and business cycle
dummies variables.
**   indicates significance at 5 per cent.
***   indicates significance at 1 per cent.
Finally, the estimated effects of non-employment on wages by job category
are provided in Table 69. They suggest that for all type of occupations it holds
                                          
9   The job category variable has been recoded in four categories in comparison with Table 1:
category 1 is recoded as 1 (white collar skilled workers); categories 2, 3 and 4 as 2 (clerical
workers); category 5 as 3 (blue collar skilled workers); and categories 6 and 7 as 4 (blue collar
unskilled workers).
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the general finding we have obtained previously: the longer the non-
employment spell, the larger the damage on future wages. Nevertheless, one
category of workers is even more seriously affected by the magnitude of wage
losses: the skilled manual workers. After a non-employment spell of more than
three years, wage losses are found to be larger than 14 por cent10. The esti-
mated effects are somewhat persistent for this group since wages increase 10
per cent after three years in re-employment, while in the rest of categories the
wage gains are larger (especially for workers in non-manual occupations).
6.3.   The effect of the number of job interruptions
The main characteristic of the sample of workers we use in this investigation
is that all of them have ever entered the UCS and have had at least two job in-
terruptions. In fact, as we said before, three out of four individuals in the sample
have experienced only two job interruptions, while the rest have had three, four
or at least five spells. One interesting question we want to address is whether
multiple job separations affect significantly wage patterns. In other words, does
the number of job interruptions experienced by workers influence the magni-
tude of subsequent wage losses after a job separation?
Table 7
LOG REAL DAILY WAGE EQUATIONS BY NUMBER OF JOB INTERRUPTIONS
All sample Men Women
Coeff.
(Std. error)
Signif. Coeff.
(Std. error)
Signif. Coeff.
(Std. error)
Signif.
Job interruptions
  2
  3
  4
  5+
—
-0.008
(0.003)
-0.041
(0.007)
-0.096
(0.009)
**
***
***
—
-0.007
(0.004)
-0.041
(0.008)
-0.071
(0.012)
*
***
***
—
-0.009
(0.005)
-0.041
(0.011)
-0.129
(0.014)
*
***
***
Notes:   Regression controls for individual fixed effects, regions, age, children, tenure, previous
non-employment spells and calendar and business cycle dummies variables.
*   indicates significance at 10 per cent.
**   indicates significance at 5 per cent.
***   indicates significante at 1 per cent.
Previous results using separated samples for workers divided by their number
of job separations (see Table 4) already indicated that wage losses associated
                                          
10   For the US economy, Podgursky and Swaim (1987b) find that blue-collar workers are
more penalized than white-collar workers. Gregory and Jukes (2001), analysing the UK la-
bour market, also find that skilled manual workers are those who suffer larger wage losses.
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with the length of previous non-employment spells are larger for workers who
experience a higher number of job interruptions. Now, we estimate the same
model using the whole sample and including in the regression dummy variables
which indicate the number of previous job interruptions. Table 7 presents the
estimated effects on log real daily wage equations taking account of this.
Compared to workers who have only had two job interruptions, an individual
who come into current employment after experiencing three job interruptions
earn about 0.8 per cent less. This wage penalty effect increases up to 4 and 10
percent for individuals who have experienced four or at lest five job interrup-
tions, respectively. The effect of previous job interruptions is larger in the case of
women than in the case of men but only for the most unstable workers: female
wage penalty at least double that for for men when the number of job interrup-
tions is at least five. In summary, the first job interruptions seem to carry small
wage penalties but subsequent job interruptions are associated with the largest
wage losses.
7.   CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this paper has been to investigate the effects of length of time
since a job separation, multiple job interruptions, and duration upon re-
employment on subsequent wages using information for Spanish workers over
the 1980s and 1990s coming from an administrative dataset, the HSIPRE.
Evidence has been found (for workers as a whole and for groups of workers
differentated by various characteristics) that past non-employment damages fu-
ture wages (the so called “scarring effect”). Since our sample consists of workers
who have been in unemployment at least twice (i.e. they all have experienced
some unemployment sometimes in the past), we are unable to compare the ex-
perience of the unemployed with the experience of those workers continuously
employed. However, it is possible to analyse the influence of non-employment
duration and multiple job separations on wage patterns. We have detected that
the longer the time spent in non-employment since job separation and the
higher the number of job interruptions, the larger the wage penalty attached to
future re-employment relationships.
According to human capital theory, this effect may come up since, when the
relationship between the worker and the firm is terminated, the contribution of
firm-specific skills to the worker’s productivity finishes and unemployment ex-
perience may lead to the depreciation of general skills. It may also arise because
workers with longer non-employment durations and multiple job interruptions
achieve lower wages as employers may consider them as low productivity
workers, as the imperfect information theory suggests.
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Furthermore, non-employment duration is found to have a temporary penalty
effect on wages, since it is eliminated after one year in re-employment: once
workers come back to employment and accumulate tenure, they obtain wage
gains. This effect is consistent with the human capital theory: workers obtain
higher wages as long as they accumulate firm specific skills again. It is also con-
sistent with predictions from the imperfect information theory: if new workers
prove to be of a higher productivity than the employer initially inferred from their
unemployment history, the initial wage penalty at the time of re-employment due
to incomplete information should be eroded over time.
In particular, the main specific findings we have obtained in this investigation
are the following:
1) The relative wage penalty (in comparison with those with a non-
employment spell of one year or less) attached to those workers re-
entering to a job after having stayed in non-employment between two
and three years is estimated to be about 2 per cent. This wage penalty
increases to 5 per cent if workers face a non-employment spell of three
years or more. At the same time, returning to a job implies a wage gain
of 12 per cent if the job lasts between two and three years, increasing to
almost 19 per cent if the job lasts at least three years.
2) The wage losses associated with the length of previous non-employment
spells increase with the number of job interruptions, while the wage gains
associated with the duration of the subsequent job match decrease with
that number. This result imply that individuals with more job interruptions
do not face the same opportunities to recover from wage losses caused by
job separations.
3) Men are detected to be more scarred than women. Average wage re-
ductions three years or more after a job loss are above 6 per cent in the
case of men and 3 per cent in the case of women.
4) Workers who experience a job interruption because they were laid off are
found to be more scarred relative to comparable workers whose tempo-
rary contract ended. The penalty wage attached to a non-employment
spell of three or more years of duration is estimated to be about 10 per
cent in the case of laid off workers and about 4 per cent in the case of
those workers whose contract ended. In addition, re-employment wage
gains increase more quickly for the latter.
5) Among young workers (aged under 35), subsequent wages do not seem
to be damaged by job interruptions. However, workers aged 35-45 and,
particularly, workers aged more than 45 are seriously scarred. For this
group of workers, we have found an average wage penalty above 7 per
cent if they remain in non-employment at least three years.
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6) All categories of occupations exhibit realtive wage losses due to non-
employment durations, but they are larger for workers in manual skilled
occupations. The penalty effect for this group is more permanent: if the
re-employment relationship lasts at least three years, the wage gain turns
out to be around 10 per cent. Instead, for similar workers in non-manual
skilled occupations, wage gains after three years in employment increase
to more than 21 per cent.
7) The workers with few job interruptions present the shortest scarring
effect. It is less than 1 per cent for those who have experienced two job
interruptions. Subsequent spells of job separations command larger wage
penalties (more pronounced for women than for men). This wage penalty
increases to 7 per cent for men and 14 per cent for women if they face at
least five job interruptions. This implies a substantial scarring effect caused
by increasing number of job interruptions.
Our general findings are broadly similar to those obtained in previous studies
for other countries. In particular, Arulampalam (2001) and Gregory and Jukes
(2001) for the UK obtain that the impact of non-employment duration is pro-
portional to the length of separations among jobs (the long-term penalty at-
tached to non-employment spells is estimated to be around 10 per cent) and
that wage gains increase with tenure in the current job after re-employment.
For the US, Stevens (1997) finds that much of the persistence of wage losses
can be explained by additional job separations after an initial one: average wage
losses for all workers (including those with multiple job separations) are around
9 per cent six or more years after a job loss, while those workers who avoid
additional job losses suffer wage penalties of only 4 per cent.
These findings suggest important implications for policies. On the other hand,
from a macroeconomic point of view, since prevention of unemployment is
better than cure, one important feature to enhance the re-employment pros-
pects of the unemployed would be a high level of economic activity, which re-
duces the duration of unemployment spells.
On the other hand, scarring can contribute to wage inequality and poverty,
and can interfere with work incentives. There is a need to provide financial in-
centives to those individuals to go back to employment that carries a wage
penalty. As scarring seems to be particularly important in the case of the long-
term unemployed and older workers, programmes aimed at the prevention of
long-term unemployment and targeted to particular groups of workers should
be in the public agenda. At the same time, active policies towards job finding
would be efficient since they can reduce individual unemployment durations
and speed up the return to employment.
Finally, appropriate on-the-job training and more stable jobs would avoid de-
preciation in acquired skills and undesirable effects linked to the employment-
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unemployment chain. Supply-side policies that make individuals more employa-
ble and increase work incentives should go hand in hand with demand-side poli-
cies to generate more (stable) employment.
APPENDIX
Table A.1
DISTRIBUTION OF TENURE IN CURRENT EMPLOYMENT,
PREVIOUS NON-EMPLOYMENT DURATION AND PREVIOUS UNEMPLOYMENT
DURATION FOR WORKERS WITH TWO EMPLOYMENT SPELLS
1st employment 2nd employment
E E PNE PU
Duration (months)
  ≤ 6
  > 6 and ≤ 12
  > 12 and ≤ 24
  > 24 and ≤ 36
  > 36
0.387
0.201
0.173
0.117
0.122
0.180
0.313
0.228
0.154
0.125
0.367
0.211
0.242
0.110
0.070
0.628
0.156
0.164
0.038
0.014
Mean (days) 537.5 638.3 411.5 249.6
Sample 50,460
Note:   E = tenure in employment; PNE = previous non-employment; PU = previous unemployment.
Table A.2
DISTRIBUTION OF TENURE IN CURRENT EMPLOYMENT,
PREVIOUS NON-EMPLOYMENT DURATION AND PREVIOUS UNEMPLOYMENT
DURATION FOR WORKERS WITH THREE EMPLOYMENT SPELLS
1st employment 2nd employment 3rd employment
E E PNE PU E PNE PU
Duration (months)
  ≤ 6
  > 6 and ≤ 12
  > 12 and ≤ 24
  > 24 and ≤ 36
  > 36
0.523
0.185
0.139
0.078
0.074
0.456
0.262
0.183
0.070
0.029
0.463
0.253
0.203
0.059
0.022
0.746
0.131
0.106
0.014
0.004
0.171
0.396
0.237
0.126
0.070
0.411
0.251
0.229
0.078
0.031
0.713
0.149
0.117
0.019
0.002
Mean (days) 423.6 398.2 292.2 181.7 548.8 332.8 196.7
Sample 11,483
Note:   E = tenure in employment; PNE = previous non-employment; PU = previous unemployment.
Table A.3
DISTRIBUTION OF TENURE IN CURRENT EMPLOYMENT, PREVIOUS NON-EMPLOYMENT DURATION AND
PREVIOUS UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION FOR WORKERS WITH FOUR EMPLOYMENT SPELLS
1st employment 2nd employment 3rd employment 4th employment
E E PNE PU E PNE PU E PNE PU
Duration (months)
  ≤ 6
  > 6 and ≤ 12
  > 12 and ≤ 24
  > 24 and ≤ 36
  > 36
0.634
0.160
0.110
0.056
0.040
0.659
0.197
0.106
0.029
0.009
0.562
0.250
0.156
0.028
0.004
0.844
0.092
0.062
0.002
0.000
0.480
0.300
0.158
0.053
0.010
0.553
0.279
0.141
0.023
0.004
0.854
0.089
0.053
0.003
0.000
0.192
0.451
0.228
0.094
0.035
0.445
0.267
0.213
0.059
0.017
0.779
0.131
0.082
0.007
0.001
Mean (days) 344.5 293.9 224.6 136.8 353.9 219.6 137.1 480.1 295.1 168.6
Sample 2,356
Note:   E = tenure in employment; PNE = previous non-employment; PU = previous unemployment.
Table A.4
DISTRIBUTION OF TENURE IN CURRENT EMPLOYMENT, PREVIOUS NON-EMPLOYMENT DURATION AND
PREVIOUS UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION FOR WORKERS WITH AT LEAST FIVE EMPLOYMENT SPELLS
1st employment 2nd employment 3rd employment 4th employment 5th employment
E E PNE PU E PNE PU E PNE PU E PNE PU
Duration (months)
  ≤ 6
  > 6 and ≤ 12
  > 12 and ≤ 24
  > 24 and ≤ 36
  > 36
0.765
0.105
0.051
0.057
0.023
0.824
0.114
0.040
0.015
0.006
0.651
0.237
0.093
0.014
0.004
0.920
0.037
0.039
0.002
0.001
0.769
0.163
0.057
0.007
0.004
0.726
0.217
0.054
0.003
0.000
0.941
0.042
0.016
0.000
0.000
0.573
0.349
0.061
0.015
0.001
0.695
0.232
0.064
0.007
0.003
0.932
0.042
0.025
0.001
0.000
0.316
0.525
0.118
0.030
0.011
0.624
0.229
0.122
0.018
0.007
0.912
0.053
0.036
0.000
0.000
Mean (days) 292.1 235.1 188.0 115.6 240.6 167.3 108.8 279.0 175.7 116.7 358.3 216.8 133.7
Sample 1,041
Note:   E = tenure in employment; PNE = previous non-employment; PU = previous unemployment.
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Table A.5
DAILY WAGES (€ in 1990) FOR WORKERS WITH TWO EMPLOYMENT SPELLS
1st employment 2nd employment
Variables
Mean Std. Freq. Mean Std. Freq.
Gender
  Women
  Men
19.21
21.43
7.67
8.97
21554
28906
21.24
23.96
9.35
10.47
21554
28906
Age (years old)
  > 20 and ≤ 25
  > 25 and ≤ 30
  > 30 and ≤ 35
  > 35 and ≤ 40
  > 40 and ≤ 45
  > 45
19.04
21.83
22.73
22.26
22.79
23.02
6.37
9.12
10.53
10.81
12.02
12.62
27839
10599
4812
3220
2324
1666
20.65
23.21
24.62
24.15
23.77
24.04
7.43
9.73
11.69
12.01
12.03
12.56
15397
17427
7702
4071
2860
3003
Job category
  High level/associated
    professional technicians and
    supervisors
  Technical assistants and skilled
    clerical workers
  Semi-skilled clerical workers
  Unskilled clerical workers
  Skilled production workers
  Semi-skilled production
    workers
  Unskilled production workers
  Missing
35.38
24.93
21.78
20.00
20.68
19.67
18.22
11.36
14.25
10.62
6.52
6.36
6.52
6.03
5.15
0.25
3090
4462
1932
8398
7219
9195
13021
3143
38.84
26.68
23.30
21.79
22.18
20.87
19.07
11.14
14.93
11.29
7.50
7.48
7.54
7.14
6.05
0.19
4045
5943
2196
8138
9407
8573
10512
1646
Current tenure (months)
  ≤ 6
  > 6 and ≤ 12
  > 12 and ≤ 24
  > 24 and ≤ 36
  > 36
18.87
19.83
20.83
20.72
25.99
6.91
7.55
7.90
8.39
12.36
19540
10155
8718
5898
6149
20.34
19.88
23.92
25.28
28.57
8.28
8.90
9.32
10.28
12.50
9094
15796
11510
7749
6311
Past unemployment (months)
  ≤ 6
  > 6 and ≤ 12
  > 12 and ≤ 24
  > 24 and ≤ 36
  > 36
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
23.28
23.35
21.72
19.19
17.79
10.30
9.95
9.69
7.99
7.31
31686
7878
8266
1903
727
Past non-employment (months)
  ≤ 6
  > 6 and ≤ 12
  > 12 and ≤ 24
  > 24 and ≤ 36
  > 36
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
24.27
23.00
22.18
20.81
19.77
10.78
9.77
9.57
8.78
9.61
18507
10629
12234
5547
3543
(Keep.)
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(Continuation.)
1st employment 2nd employment
Variables
Mean Std. Freq. Mean Std. Freq.
Children
  Yes
  No
22.53
20.04
11.14
7.75
9031
41429
23.58
22.50
11.60
9.43
14043
36417
Reason for job termination
  End of contract
  Collective layoff
  Individual layoff
  Others
19.82
23.58
27.08
23.41
7.50
11.94
11.79
8.92
42392
7027
947
94
22.11
26.53
29.73
31.04
9.27
13.33
12.74
14.01
43211
6339
837
73
Sample 50,460
Table A.6
DAILY WAGES (€ in 1990) FOR WORKERS WITH THREE EMPLOYMENT SPELLS
1st employment 2nd employment 3rd employment
Variables
Mean Std. Freq. Mean Std. Freq. Mean Std. Freq.
Gender
  Women
  Men
18.79
19.80
6.85
7.32
4115
7368
20.88
22.14
8.37
8.56
4115
7368
21.58
22.77
9.80
9.26
4115
7368
Age (years old)
  > 20 and ≤ 25
  > 25 and ≤ 30
  > 30 and ≤ 35
  > 35 and ≤ 40
  > 40 and ≤ 45
  > 45
18.66
20.53
21.07
20.53
20.85
19.59
6.05
7.66
9.22
8.92
9.40
8.85
6894
2215
974
637
458
305
20.54
22.68
22.59
22.46
23.00
21.46
6.93
9.04
9.96
9.61
10.69
9.37
5043
3413
1272
754
561
440
20.73
22.39
23.59
22.78
22.50
22.64
7.98
8.88
10.89
10.40
10.52
10.27
2171
4927
2064
962
649
710
Job category
  High level/associated
    professional technicians and
    supervisors
  Technical assistants and skilled
    clerical workers
  Semi-skilled clerical workers
  Unskilled clerical workers
  Skilled production workers
  Semi-skilled production
    workers
  Unskilled production workers
  Missing
31.06
23.08
21.44
19.32
19.54
19.18
18.06
11.36
12.17
9.66
6.31
5.88
5.46
5.64
5.20
0.29
582
817
441
1594
1719
2214
3469
647
35.15
24.74
22.22
20.98
21.26
20.56
19.11
11.20
13.70
9.86
7.04
6.74
6.62
6.64
6.12
0.20
744
1060
534
1595
2341
2123
2950
136
37.10
26.04
22.44
21.78
21.83
21.21
19.32
11.06
13.97
10.95
7.45
7.49
7.18
7.64
6.47
0.16
785
1250
548
1496
2658
1869
2488
389
Current tenure (months)
  ≤ 6
  > 6 and ≤ 12
  > 12 and ≤ 24
  > 24 and ≤ 36
  > 36
18.68
19.68
19.72
18.93
24.18
6.37
6.75
6.75
7.30
11.16
6008
2124
1598
901
852
20.31
21.34
23.63
24.33
27.88
7.52
8.44
8.59
9.82
12.58
5239
3012
2097
801
334
21.02
19.78
24.47
25.44
27.28
8.86
8.86
8.86
9.73
10.61
1963
4542
2720
1449
809
(Keep.)
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1st employment 2nd employment 3rd employment
Variables
Mean Std. Freq. Mean Std. Freq. Mean Std. Freq.
Past unemployment (months)
  ≤ 6
  > 6 and ≤ 12
  > 12 and ≤ 24
  > 24 and ≤ 36
  > 36
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
21.66
22.37
21.47
19.33
17.22
8.46
8.71
8.72
7.34
6.88
8565
1501
1216
156
45
22.79
22.72
20.03
17.56
14.55
9.60
8.96
9.01
8.07
4.70
8191
1709
1348
215
20
Past non-employment (months)
  ≤ 6
  > 6 and ≤ 12
  > 12 and ≤ 24
  > 24 and ≤ 36
  > 36
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
22.12
21.63
21.34
20.75
18.91
8.84
8.28
8.02
8.33
8.11
5320
2903
2328
679
253
23.62
22.68
21.14
19.49
18.84
9.83
9.13
9.03
8.81
8.86
4725
2878
2626
896
358
Children
  Yes
  No
20.46
19.24
9.03
6.73
1866
9617
21.97
21.60
9.47
8.20
2633
8850
22.46
22.29
10.07
9.20
3524
7959
Reason for job termination
  End of contract
  Collective layoff
  Individual layoff
  Others
19.15
21.26
24.44
22.09
6.63
9.93
11.64
6.28
10109
1233
117
24
21.47
24.06
27.57
26.59
8.12
11.85
14.46
8.92
10634
758
77
14
22.05
24.41
27.02
30.61
9.13
11.55
11.87
10.96
10216
1121
126
20
Sample 11,483
Table A.7
DAILY WAGES (€ in 1990) FOR WORKERS WITH FOUR EMPLOYMENT SPELLS
1st employment 2nd employment 3rd employment 4th employment
Variables
Mean Std. Freq. Mean Std. Freq. Mean Std. Freq. Mean Std. Freq.
Gender
  Women
  Men
18.70
18.86
6.92
6.18
797
1559
20.34
20.53
7.51
6.81
797
1559
20.82
22.09
8.90
8.40
797
1559
20.91
21.87
9.50
8.68
797
1559
Age (years old)
  > 20 and ≤ 25
  > 25 and ≤ 30
  > 30 and ≤ 35
  > 35 and ≤ 40
  > 40 and ≤ 45
  > 45
18.60
19.53
19.24
18.19
18.22
18.77
6.20
6.31
7.89
6.55
4.91
8.56
1403
444
225
129
102
53
20.13
21.07
21.33
20.55
18.68
20.11
6.49
7.04
8.71
8.16
6.31
6.83
1126
634
248
164
112
72
21.18
22.04
22.04
23.05
19.68
20.67
7.91
8.55
9.13
11.57
6.18
7.19
765
858
315
195
113
110
20.61
21.52
22.46
22.37
21.32
19.42
7.99
8.59
9.34
11.10
9.40
7.58
274
1051
500
227
152
152
(Keep.)
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1st employment 2nd employment 3rd employment 4th employment
Variables
Mean Std. Freq. Mean Std. Freq. Mean Std. Freq. Mean Std. Freq.
Job category
  High level/associated
    professional tecnhi-
    cians and supervisors
  Technical assistants and
    skilled clerical workers
  Semi-skilled clerical
    workers
  Unskilled clerical
    workers
  Skilled production
    workers
  Semi-skilled production
    workers
  Unskilled production
    workers
  Missing
28.51
21.72
20.64
18.76
19.00
18.85
17.76
11.35
10.17
8.80
6.82
4.87
4.73
5.47
5.02
0.23
125
143
94
266
376
453
750
149
30.14
24.27
21.75
20.71
20.26
19.89
18.27
11.23
10.46
9.88
7.68
6.20
5.90
5.64
4.91
0.16
131
179
96
268
516
447
692
27
34.38
24.40
21.94
20.76
21.63
20.85
19.21
11.10
13.23
10.40
7.41
7.14
7.80
7.01
5.68
0.17
148
186
103
273
581
431
604
30
34.17
22.88
23.85
21.80
21.86
20.29
19.12
11.01
14.58
8.51
8.53
8.13
7.24
7.75
6.25
0.15
158
196
99
279
627
398
501
98
Current tenure (months)
  ≤ 6
  > 6 and ≤ 12
  > 12 and ≤ 24
  > 24 and ≤ 36
  > 36
18.77
18.50
18.79
17.09
22.95
6.51
5.74
5.55
5.80
9.10
1493
377
260
132
94
20.18
20.09
22.49
20.38
25.73
6.74
6.63
8.21
7.84
13.13
1552
464
250
68
22
20.81
20.62
24.59
25.62
27.00
7.64
8.50
9.43
10.47
11.78
1130
706
373
124
23
21.05
19.46
23.62
25.61
26.73
9.04
8.57
7.98
9.67
9.34
453
1062
536
222
83
Past unemployment
(months)
  ≤ 6
  > 6 and ≤ 12
  > 12 and ≤ 24
  > 24 and ≤ 36
  > 36
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
20.41
21.29
20.08
17.76
18.34
7.13
7.43
5.15
2.48
0.00
1989
217
145
4
1
21.74
22.32
19.78
14.12
8.65
8.49
7.56
5.61
2013
210
126
7
21.86
21.73
18.89
15.56
19.86
9.14
8.57
7.62
7.02
1.85
1835
308
194
17
2
Past non-employment
(months)
  ≤ 6
  > 6 and ≤ 12
  > 12 and ≤ 24
  > 24 and ≤ 36
  > 36
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
20.66
20.19
20.22
20.46
20.00
7.35
6.56
6.54
7.75
8.77
1324
589
367
66
10
21.85
21.81
21.28
18.78
16.76
8.81
8.31
8.28
8.53
5.11
1302
658
332
54
10
22.64
21.53
20.24
19.10
17.94
9.82
8.04
8.51
7.01
7.00
1048
629
501
139
39
Children
  Yes
  No
18.79
18.81
6.95
6.34
379
1977
20.27
20.52
7.11
7.04
505
1851
21.58
21.69
8.82
8.52
589
1767
21.44
21.59
9.45
8.76
721
1635
Reason for job termination
  End of contract
  Collective layoff
  Individual layoff
  Others
18.70
19.92
21.45
18.13
6.36
7.28
6.23
2.41
2165
179
10
2
20.44
20.52
27.09
18.64
6.95
8.27
11.79
0.63
2229
115
10
2
21.54
23.59
28.26
22.33
8.44
10.57
13.48
7.72
2231
115
8
2
21.44
22.41
26.73
32.37
8.90
9.63
8.17
21.80
2166
175
13
2
Sample 2,356
Table A.8
DAILY WAGES (€ IN 1990) FOR WORKERS WITH AT LEAST FIVE EMPLOYMENT SPELLS
1st employment 2nd employment 3rd employment 4th employment 5th employment
Variables
Mean Std. Freq. Mean Std. Freq. Mean Std. Freq. Mean Std. Freq. Mean Std. Freq.
Gender
  Women
  Men
18.03
18.27
5.28
6.08
443
598
19.06
20.24
6.06
6.38
443
598
19.07
21.09
6.62
7.29
443
598
18.66
22.02
7.38
8.75
443
598
17.88
21.04
8.82
9.08
443
598
Age (years old)
  > 20 and ≤ 25
  > 25 and ≤ 30
  > 30 and ≤ 35
  > 35 and ≤ 40
  > 40 and ≤ 45
  > 45
18.08
18.94
18.32
17.72
17.45
17.54
5.20
6.19
7.24
6.28
5.39
4.87
496
201
114
95
69
66
19.28
20.46
20.95
19.25
19.79
18.41
5.61
6.78
8.05
6.05
5.69
4.85
423
235
135
91
81
76
20.28
20.45
21.10
19.62
19.99
19.04
6.64
7.00
9.03
7.44
5.90
6.15
332
293
134
106
85
91
19.53
21.06
21.82
21.31
20.25
19.08
7.50
8.01
9.50
11.20
6.98
6.41
229
344
158
113
85
112
16.75
20.13
20.93
18.61
21.18
18.44
6.71
9.24
9.37
9.19
10.94
7.62
95
373
230
120
88
135
Job category
  High level/associated professional
    technicians and supervisors
  Technical assistants and skilled
    clerical workers
  Semi-skilled clerical workers
  Unskilled clerical workers
  Skilled production workers
  Semi-skilled production workers
  Unskilled production workers
  Missing
28.02
21.19
18.60
19.84
17.83
17.58
17.51
11.35
9.01
8.81
5.58
6.17
4.37
4.63
4.72
0.27
36
62
31
76
231
267
301
37
32.20
20.83
21.24
19.02
19.63
18.46
18.92
11.34
11.90
5.95
8.60
5.93
4.45
4.50
5.71
0.00
43
78
30
77
255
265
292
1
31.33
21.05
21.56
19.36
19.88
19.28
19.35
11.26
13.51
8.03
7.04
5.29
5.74
6.05
5.82
0.14
50
83
29
81
280
272
244
2
32.89
22.18
21.69
18.71
19.82
19.68
20.01
11.04
15.08
9.69
7.28
6.91
6.36
7.37
7.38
0.11
50
98
33
76
308
247
221
8
32.96
19.80
20.11
18.68
19.65
19.34
18.87
11.04
17.52
9.13
7.22
6.66
7.77
8.32
7.47
0.17
51
90
30
88
305
235
202
40
(Keep.)
(Continuation.)
1st employment 2nd employment 3rd employment 4th employment 5th employment
Variables
Mean Std. Freq. Mean Std. Freq. Mean Std. Freq. Mean Std. Freq. Mean Std. Freq.
Current tenure (months)
  ≤ 6
  > 6 and ≤ 12
  > 12 and ≤ 24
  > 24 and ≤ 36
  > 36
18.18
18.64
19.32
14.63
21.79
5.61
5.14
4.65
5.60
10.19
796
109
53
59
24
20.00
18.74
19.90
14.07
16.46
6.17
7.42
4.35
4.30
2.61
858
119
42
16
6
20.63
17.30
23.98
17.42
15.43
6.67
7.45
8.56
7.81
2.95
801
170
59
7
4
21.63
17.80
25.76
24.60
17.31
7.64
8.33
9.68
9.43
0.00
597
363
64
16
1
21.54
17.26
24.13
23.52
25.19
7.80
9.11
9.27
7.59
10.37
329
547
123
31
11
Past unemployment (months)
  ≤ 6
  > 6 and ≤ 12
  > 12 and ≤ 24
  > 24 and ≤ 36
  > 36
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
19.82
18.91
19.08
14.13
11.54
6.43
3.80
4.12
3.57
0.00
958
39
41
2
1
20.27
20.34
17.75
7.10
7.47
3.92
980
44
17
20.67
21.35
16.72
10.96
0
8.44
5.99
7.70
0.00
0
970
44
26
1
0
19.73
21.10
16.71
0
0
9.22
8.12
6.45
0
0
949
55
37
0
0
Past non-employment (months)
  ≤ 6
  > 6 and ≤ 12
  > 12 and ≤ 24
  > 24 and ≤ 36
  > 36
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
19.91
19.39
19.63
19.72
14.82
6.63
5.93
4.47
5.31
4.23
678
247
97
15
4
20.31
20.40
18.82
14.59
6.95
7.45
7.33
5.37
756
226
56
3
20.24
21.62
21.12
20.30
11.19
8.20
8.46
9.27
9.29
0.27
723
241
67
7
3
19.13
20.66
21.00
19.24
16.67
9.14
8.44
9.47
12.21
7.66
650
238
127
19
7
Children
  Yes
  No
17.73
18.28
7.15
5.32
217
824
19.84
19.70
6.57
6.17
272
769
20.46
20.14
7.30
6.99
309
732
21.81
20.00
8.64
8.15
340
701
20.35
19.33
8.54
9.39
375
666
Reason for job termination
  End of contract
  Collective layoff
  Individual layoff
  Others
18.16
18.01
24.71
0
5.78
5.04
3.65
0
986
53
2
0
19.80
18.30
18.76
0
6.29
5.69
0.00
0
1000
40
1
0
20.27
18.98
0
0
7.11
5.91
0
0
1012
29
0
0
20.60
20.21
19.20
23.72
8.39
7.42
3.88
0.00
1010
28
2
1
19.69
19.16
18.98
31.23
9.17
6.88
0.00
15.71
996
42
1
2
Sample 1,041
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